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A Contagious Living Fluid: 
Objectification and Assemblage in the History of Virology 
 
Summary of the argument  
This paper deals with the birth of the virus as an object of technoscientific analysis. 
The aim is to discuss the process of objectification of pathogen virulence in 
virological and medical discourses. Through a short excursion into the history of 
modern virology, it will be argued that far from being a matter of fact, pathogen 
virulence had to be ‘produced’, for example in petri-dishes, test-kits and hyper-real 
signification-practices. The now commonly accepted objective status of the virus has 
been an accomplishment of a complex ensemble of actors. Indeed, this shows that 
objectification rather than objectivity should be the focus of science and technology 
studies. This objectification was by no means a smooth process. It involved more 
than five decades of highly speculative and fragmented research projects before it 
became actualized as a separate discipline under the heading of virology. The 
specific objectification of the virus took place through an inter-disciplinary de-
differentiation of research questions, methodologies, techniques and technologies or 
what Thomas Kuhn referred to as 'revolutionary science'. The main argument of this 
paper is that viruses only became intelligible after the establishment of a virology-
assemblage. Its inauguration in the early 1950s was radical and sudden because 
only then could the various substrands of virological technoscience affect each other 
through deliberate enrolment and engender a universal intelligibility. 
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The Production of Pathogen Virulence: A Short History of Virology 
Modern virology was allegedly inaugurated by four independently conducted experiments 
involving different diseases which all confirmed Dimitri Iosifovich Iwanowski’s discovery of 
an organism that was responsible for mosaic disease in tobacco plants but could not be 
cultivated on its own and was small enough to pass through a bacteria-proof filter.1 This was 
1898. Up until that time, germ theory worked on the basis of three assumptions (known as 
Koch’s postulates) that ‘for each disease there is a specific micro-organisms which (1) could 
be seen with the aid of a microscope, (2) could be cultivated on a nutrient medium, and (3) 
could be retained by filters’ (Dimmock and Primrose, 1994: 1; also see Smith-Hughes, 1977). 
This was because germ theory was generally formed on the assumption that the cell was the 
basic unit and therefore defining principle of all organic life.  
In 1899, a controversy erupted between Iwanowski and the Dutch biologist Martinus 
Beyerinck over the nature of the agent of the tobacco mosaic virus. It is interesting to note 
that whereas both used the term ‘virus’ to describe the infectious agent, Iwanowski 
maintained that this referred to a small bacterium that could pass through the filters, whereas 
Beyerinck stressed that the virus was a contagium vivo fluidum - a contagious living fluid 
(Smith-Hughes, 1977: 53). However, although starting their investigations from a strict 
bacteriological framework, both found it necessary to modify their explanations about the 
infectious agent, following a series of experiments, with Iwanowski going as far as to suggest 
that the bacteria reproduced themselves via tiny spores that could only germinate inside plant 
cells. This point was in turn eclipsed by Beyerinck, who eventually completely broke away 
from bacteriology (which was exclusively based on germ theory and cell theory) and 
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suggested that the fluid had no cellular structure but was produced through intracellular 
(molecular) replication. He thereby initiated the first step towards the new discipline of 
virology. The fact that the notion of a contagium vivo fluidum was unintelligible to the then 
current paradigms in microbiology (due to the absence of cells) explains why it remained 
relatively marginal in the first decades of modern virology. 
It is worth while pointing towards the etymology of the word virus, which, according to 
dictionaries means ‘venom’ or ‘poison’ in Latin, derived from the Greek ios. However, 
Smith-Hughes points out that the original Latin the literal meaning of virus is ‘slimy liquid’. 
Although there is no philological evidence to suggest that it has anything to do with vir, 
which means ’man’ (with virility being ‘the nature of man’). This, in turn, is related to the 
Greek word menos, which, among many things refers to energy, will-power, desire, drive, 
anger and life-force (virility). It is not far fetched to suggest that menos actually refers to the 
life-fluids that men are thought to possesses and which define their masculinity, i.e. semen. 
Semen, of course, is a slimy substance. The ambivalence of this slimy substance as meaning 
both ‘life-force’ and ‘venom’ resonates the more familiar doubling of meaning in the word 
Pharmakon as meaning both medicine and poison (Derrida, 1974). However, whereas 
Pharmakon retained its ambivalence, virus became exclusively associated with menacing 
health consequences, most often as an agent of pestilence and infectious disease. For example 
at the turn of the 19th century, Edward Jenner, the ‘discoverer’ of the cow-pox-vaccine and the 
method of vaccination, used the term virus as synonymous with bacteria and other 
microbiological pathogens (Wildy, 1987). However, its original association with ‘slimy 
substance’ made a rather uncanny re-appearance in Beyerinck’s notion of contagium vivo 
fluidum, and of course, almost a century later, we seem to have gone full circle with the now 
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nearly inevitable co-location of free floating semen and HIV.2  
Highly significant in these subtle but significant semiotic shifts has been the continued 
articulation between virus and unintelligibility. The virus has always functioned as a label for 
that which cannot be named otherwise, a remainder of the known world, and a reminder of 
nature’s inherent unintelligibility. In The Pasteurization of France, Latour (1988) gives an 
account of how a rather unspecified notion of virus, generated by the Pasteurian laboratory, 
proved to be exceptionally effective in the redesigning of the political landscape of late 19th 
Century France. It was not only the combination of laboratory and field-based science, 
practical experience but above all, a unique mixture of pedagogy, dramaturgy and spectacle, 
that made Pasteur’s experiments so exhilarating and persuasive. Moreover, this in itself would 
not even be enough to explain its remarkable success in transforming French and later 
European society towards one that evolves around a deeply medicalized discipline of public 
health management.  
Wildy (1987) points towards the persistence of this unintelligibility even when the Pasteur 
Institute were already in the business of making several vaccines. It was the enrolment of 
other agents, such as the hygiene and sanitation movements (Latour, 1988; Roderick, 1997) - 
whose rise to power owed more to the emergence of ‘governmentality’ under the flag of the 
nation state than to developments in medical technoscience - that made ‘germ theory’ the 
predominant paradigm in the life sciences. ‘Germ’ is an equally elusive category which, 
however, still persists today in advertisements and product-descriptions of household 
cleaning-items, a century after the first ‘scientific discoveries’ of its rather dubious ontology.  
In decades following the Iwanowski-Beyerinck controversy, there were several ‘discoveries’3 
of submicroscopic cell-free transmissions of self-reproducing infectious diseases which thus 
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confirmed the existence of a type of pathogen agent that was not simply a small toxic 
bacterium. The other remarkable co-incidence was that – despite all the efforts -  it was only 
possible to grow these agents inside living cells. Initially, the failures in cultivating this agent 
in vitro were seen as a temporary technical difficulty of finding the appropriate medium. 
However, it became more and more apparent that such failures pointed towards a more 
fundamental aspect of these agents - one which made them radically different from bacteria. 
This led to the gradual increase in the popularity of non-microbial concepts of pathogen 
virulence. 
However, it was only with the ‘discovery’ of bacterial viruses, or bacteriophage, in 1915 by 
Twort (repeated in 1917 by d’Herelle) that a more ‘positive’ definition of these pathogens 
became possible. Through the cultivation of bacteria that were susceptible to particular 
bacteriophage, and using liquid cultures with radio-active labelling, it was possible to 
establish the relative density or ‘viral load’ of particular samples of cultivated test fluid 
(Smith-Hughes, 1977: 85). This technique, however, was soon to be replaced by the plaque 
assay method, in which plaque-units of particular viral infections (which caused the formation 
of crystallized plaques on bacterial cultures) could be counted to indicate the efficiency of 
plating (EOP) of particular samples. However, it took almost 15 and 50 years to develop 
similar techniques for plant and animal viruses respectively, where the destruction of cells 
forms the basic medium of tracing the virus.  
Visibility and Indexicality 
It already becomes apparent that one of the key problems of early virology was the lack of  
visibility of their main object of study - viruses. Indeed, it was not until 1939 that a virus had 
been successfully visualized using an electron microscope. From its inception, virology 
evolved around a very strong notion of what John Law (1995) and Annemarie Mol (1998) 
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termed ‘virtual objects’. Essential to Law and Mol’s understanding of the virtual object is the 
assumption or even imagination of a singular entity as both the primordial causal principle of 
a range of manifestations and ‘hidden’ beneath the dense texture of practices and discourses 
of say management or clinical medicine. For Mol (1998: 150) ‘[t]his single entity is then 
projected as a virtual object behind the “aspects” that “surface”. This virtual object resides 
inside the body’. Moreover, the virtual object is being revealed and enframed by these 
discursive practices and techniques, i.e. its manifestations are being performed as 
commanding evidence of its alleged presence. Law, furthermore, shows that different 
discursive practices and techniques may reveal and enframe different aspects of the virtual 
object, or even different virtual objects. What is striking, therefore, is the multiplicity that is 
inherent in virtual objectification. This multiplicity generates the dense complexity of 
everyday life practices, including decisions and judgements of what needs to be done. This 
also means that despite a surface appearance of unity and rationality, technoscientific 
objectification entails far more ambivalence and insecurity, in which closures are performed 
not by following the rules of Scientific Method but far more by intuition, symbolic exchange 
and political association (also see Latour, 1988). 
For more than 50 years, it was impossible to trace any viral organism infecting animal cells 
beyond the infection itself. And even then, assay methods could only work on the basis of 
what social scientists would call ‘indexicality’ - indexing the presence of a viral virtual object 
by revealing an experimentally linked effect. Indexicality is a term used by the 
ethnomethodological sociologist Garfinkel (1967), who appropriated it within a 
phenomenological perspective to describe the necessity of the particular, context-specific and 
relational character of understanding any enunciation. However, indexicality can be used in a 
second way, which relates not to a phenomenological, but to a more hermeneutic tradition; in 
particular that of the pragmatic language philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. 
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Peirce (1986) used the term 'index', as a category placed between 'icon' (a form of signification 
that works through resemblance) and 'symbol' (a form of signification that works through a 
complex system of rules). The index is thus a form of signification that operates on the basis of a 
natural referential relationship, such as smoke in relation to fire. Eco (1977) refined this and 
criticized its rather naive naturalist assumption, by referring to the index as a relational signifier 
that operates on the basis of material tracing. That is, an index is like a trace of something else, 
indicating that this 'other entity' was once, but no longer, 'present' (Derrida, 1982; anonymous, 
1996). The relationship between indexicality and the virtual object becomes apparent here. 
Scientific evidence is based on techniques of ‘revealing’ and ‘enframing’ through which 
particular virtual objects are ‘ordered’ (both in terms of classification and commandment). The 
alleged natural relationship between the index and the virtual object (which is often produced by 
laboratory experiments) is based on already existing indexical associations between the sign and 
the referent. Indeed, neither Law nor Mol would necessarily limit their notion of virtual object to 
what can work as scientific evidence. Indeed, the existence of a virtual object itself is a 
performative effect of discursive practices and techniques, rather than fixed in a realist 
epistemology. This is also why the idea of scientific truth finds little contradiction in the 
sociological evidence of multiplicity. It is the singularity of the virtual object, the ‘it’ beneath the 
manifold manifestations produced by different techniques of enframing and revealing, that holds 
multiplicity and singularity together. 
Hence, virology evolved through the appropriation of technologies that enhanced the status of 
the virus as virtual object, by manipulating its indexicality. Until the coming of electron 
microscopy, viruses were only existent indirectly, as observable effects. Beyond these 
‘effects’ viruses were (and are still) predominantly meta-physical (only very large viruses had 
ever been ‘seen’ before - but never in enough detail to discern any properties). In the first half 
of this century, the development of virological knowledge was extremely diffused and highly 
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speculative. It was not until the development of more elaborate techniques of visualization, in 
particular those enhancing the indexicality of viral infections, that virology could become 
established as a separate discipline.4  
Visualization, signification and valorization 
Many contemporary analysts of science and technology have argued and shown how 
scientific notions of ‘objectivity’ have always (or at least since Plato) been ordained by the 
principle of visibility (Adam, 1990; Haraway, 1988, 1989; Foucault, 1970). Technologies of 
visualization involve a connectivity between the operating systems of science, politics, media 
and to a lesser extend commerce (as the drive behind what is ‘worth’ to be seen), which all 
operate to grant certain insights to phenomena in terms of validity, ethics and (aesthetic as well 
as economic) appeal (anonymous, 2000; anonymous and Sabelis, 1997). Indeed, modern 
technoscience is centrally concerned with ‘presenting’, that is the making visible of phenomena 
on the basis of accounting for their existence in terms of causality. Technoscience grants insights 
beneath manifestations (effects) that uncover their appeal to reality on a different plane of 
visibility: not that of the obviousness of myth, but that of a decontextualized mode of exploration 
in which particles are to be traced and identified as causes responsible for particular effects.  
However, by the same token, if technoscience is driven by a desire for the colonization of the 
unknown, it can only do so by creating another remainder, of that which defies visualization. 
An index is used to trace a specific virus, and not something else. Technologies of 
visualization are thus simultaneously technologies of disappearance. They turn the unknown-
category of infectious agency into the obscure. There is no place for the obscure in modern 
thought (apart from being the opposite of clarity). The old, unspecific sense of virus must 
therefore be displaced by technologies of visualization, and further split into ‘known’ and 
‘unknown’ particles. The known particles are targeted for research and experimentation, whilst 
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the unknown necessarily remain forgotten. The acquisition of knowledge of viruses is a matter of 
making them insightful, making present, that is, of enpresenting. Enpresenting is a ‘brining into 
being’, it is neither ‘presenting’ nor ‘representing’ as both notions imply a difference between 
essence (real) and appearance (image). Enpresenting is an act of disclosure that constitutes the 
disclosed and what can be disclosed (anonymous, 1996). Enpresenting thus suggests a process of 
becoming visible, a process that takes time. Viruses, then, are not a present but a becoming-
present. They highlight that being and temporality are intricately connected. 
However, the division between the known and the unknown requires more than mere 
visualization, that is, the enpresenting of virulence is not simply a matter of co-presence, being-
in-time, but requires an interval of signification, the endowment with sign-value. If it were an 
exclusive matter of visualization, virulence would only be a ‘present-at-hand’. In order for 
virulence to appear ‘ready-to-hand’, an endowment with sign-value is required (see Anonymous, 
1996). Only by acquiring sign-value can virulence be incorporated into flows of symbolic 
exchange and circulate freely in the world of ideas. Virulence can for example be aestheticized, 
become a work of art, but it can also be edified, as something to be cherished and taken care of, a 
matter of concern. Finally it can be rationalized, as has been the prevailing mode of cultivation 
within public health management today, in which pathogen virulence becomes something that 
needs ‘an account’ and requires ‘a response’ according to a logic that is considered to be 
‘internal’, that is generated by the virus itself .5 
Rationalization, aestheticization and edification are all effects of technologies of signification. 
Although technoscience certainly plays a crucial role in signification, the allocation of 
‘significance’ can never be a matter of science alone. In contrast, significance is a social attribute 
that is much more central to the operating systems of media, politics and commerce. 
Technologies of signification install into the ‘present form’ strings of symbolic associations 
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which allow people not only to ‘come to terms’ with the new insights granted by technologies of 
visualization, but also to encounter them properly, both in syntagmatic and paradigmatic terms. 
Moreover, technologies of signification allow such symbolic associations to take place in a 
partially preconstituted semantic and grammatical order, which grants the necessary discursive 
continuity that ‘reception’ requires and enables a ‘response’ to make sense. In short, technologies 
of signification set into work a symbolic exchange that allocates accountability and responsivity 
to those involved in the (dis)continuation of the communication flows.  
What is furthermore required for this significance to become a vehicle for the enrolment of other 
actants is its valorization in political, cultural as well as economic terms. Without valorization, 
objectification would not result in the mobilization of more resources to engender a more 
permanent establishment of material and discursive production. Technoscience is nothing 
without a continuous input from business and commerce, and legitimation from government and 
general public. In order to secure the continued mobilization of these valued types of capital, it 
must submit itself to the various processes of capital transformation. As a result, the products of 
technoscientific research can be expressed through the various economic, political and cultural 
exchange flows. 
On the basis of the aforementioned analysis, one could suggest that only when technologies of 
visualization, signification and valorization can be made to work in some form of ‘ensemble’ 
does it make any sense to speak of ‘objectification’. Without some co-ordination between the 
attributions of sense, meaning and value to the ‘itness’ of any virtual object, it is impossible to 
determine whether one refers to the same virtual object: ‘it’. That is to say, whereas we may 
assume that there will be multiplicity, there must always be a disclosure of means of 
transcoding from sense to meaning to value and vice versa. The different techniques that 
produce different manifestations can only be brought to render an account of the same virtual 
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object ‘it’, if the ordering of ‘it’ – its indexicality – can be decoded and encoded in a new 
language by a singular machine (an example of this would be the role of digitalization in 
telematics).6 This ‘transcoding’ is the work of what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) have referred 
to as ‘assemblage’. According to Deleuze & Guattari assemblages 
operate in zones where milieus become decoded: they begin by extracting a territory from 
the milieus. Every assemblage is basically territorial. The first concrete rule for 
assemblages is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one… The 
territory is made of decoded fragments of all kinds, which are borrowed from the milieus 
but then assume the value of “properties”… The territory is more than the organism and 
the milieu, and the relation between the two, that is why the assemblage goes beyond mere 
“behaviour” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 503-4). 
The first step in the formation of an assemblage, therefore, is the territorialization of a 
particular milieu, or part of it. This formation takes place through ‘decoding’. Through 
decoding, an assemblage is able to appropriate particular elements from that milieu as 
‘information’. Deleuze & Guattari (ibid.: 505) assert that every assemblage consists of two 
axes: (1) content and expression and (2) territory and deterritorialization. The first axis simply 
refers to the assemblage being both a semiotic system (a regime of signs) and a pragmatic 
system (a regime of actions and passions). In other words, technoscience does not merely 
‘objectify’ things in words. Viruses are not merely ‘objects’ of virological discourse. For 
example, they are also engendered in clinical medicine, epidemiology, pharmacology, popular 
culture and public, health administration. Moreover, discursive practices are not the only, 
perhaps not even the primordial, modes of enpresenting. The encoding/decoding 
(de)territorializations of the milieu engendered by the virological machinic assemblage often 
defy the logos of signification. Hence, the objectification of viruses is primarily the effect of a 
complex ensemble of practices including - but not exclusively - discursive ones. In the next 
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section, I will briefly describe how virology can be seen as a setting-into-work, or 
objectification, of the truth of a virus.  
Producing Pathogen Virulence 
In contemporary virology, there are basically four technologies of visualization: (1) electron 
microscopy, (2) multiplication; (3) serology; and (4) detection of viral nucleic acid. Of these, 
only one is actually optic - electron microscopy. The other three are indexical. When electron 
microscopy was first applied to the study of viruses by Kausche, Pfankuch and Ruska in 
1939, it disclosed the until then submicroscopic world of viruses, allowing much more 
accurate visualization of the virus-morphology and measurements of the various sizes of virus 
particles. The importance of this direct visualization cannot be overestimated, as it is 
generally conceived as the decisive evidence of the existence of a distinct species of virus. 
However, the scope and intensity of magnification of the electron microscope engenders 
models that remain relatively unintelligible, even for highly trained experts. Unless you 
already know what you are looking for, the electron microscope is not very useful as an initial 
medium for visual objectification. Moreover, whereas for laboratory science the electron 
microscope may have provided a breakthrough, this did not cover the full range of virological 
work, which apart from a laboratory-scientific element, also encompasses clinical medicine, 
where disease, not a virus, is the central virtual object under consideration.7 However, 
because we lack sufficient space here to deal with medical virology, the rest of this analysis 
simply focuses on some key aspects of virology as a laboratory science which will already 
show that objectification – even under the most ideal and controlled conditions – remains a 
messy, dirty and above all ambivalent business.  
The technique of multiplication is always the first step in any diagnosis of pathogen virulence. 
In order to detect a virus, one must first reproduce it in sufficient numbers to understand the 
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effects it causes. This technique allows one to map the temporal trajectories of viral 
replication. Using microscopes, radio-active particles and - above all - mechanisms of 
counting, the (indexical) visualization of viral agents has been dramatically intensified over 
the last century. Laboratory animals have often provided a most effective cultivation medium 
as this allowed observes to analyse the overall effects of the infection on the organism, rather 
than on individual cells only. Mapping viral multiplication reveals a rather complex pattern of 
latency and acceleration, which in turn engendered theoretical reflections on how viruses 
engage with the cells of living organisms in order to reproduce themselves. Different viruses 
display different patterns of multiplication. 
The second development in viral detection evolved with immunology and serology. Complex 
organisms rely on the production of antibodies to fend off microbiological infections. The 
antibodies are ‘tagged’ (for example with radioactive or fluorescent material) through which  
the analyst can trace their presence in blood samples. The development of vaccination as a 
medical instrument for the improvement of immunity amongst populations has also enabled 
virologists to develop more elaborate tools for identifying viruses. Here the nature of modern 
technoscience is very profoundly revealed as that of a coupling of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘performance’. More precisely any particular understanding of causation is paired with a 
particular technology of intervention. Indeed, as Foucault (1970) already argued, the break of 
the modern episteme was not so much that of the discovery of a whole new set of data or 
laws, but the very organization of knowledge into laws of causation and functionality, rather 
than classification and representation. Hence science and technology could now legitimately 
transform themselves from merely shadowing God’s Plan, to manipulating and manufacturing 
it.  
A third major development in virology enabled a further ‘objectification’ of viruses. Through 
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differential centrifugation (centrifugation at different speeds) and subsequently blotting, 
viruses could be purified and their chemical make-up could thus me identified. The discovery 
of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) by Stanley in 1935 and RNA (ribonucleic acid) in viruses by 
Bawden and Pirie in 1937 problematized the then dominant concepts of life in biology as well 
as philosophy. Viruses emerged as intermediaries between the worlds of microbiology and 
biochemistry. They became nodal points in the development of an emergent micro-bio-
chemical paradigm that is currently known as ‘genetics. After the second world war 
development in genetics further enabled virologists to elaborate on their theories of viral 
reproduction, in which it was argued that the DNA and RNA were the only carriers of 
hereditary information (Dimmock and Primrose, 1994: 7). The turn to genetics was seized by 
virologists to develop complex mechanisms of genetic manipulation through which these 
virtual objects would become actants in more complex systems of information-production. 
The introduction of genetic manipulation into virology further enabled virologists to identify 
the particular nature of viruses as different from their host cells. Whereas host cells always 
contain both types of nucleic acid, viruses always only have either DNA or RNA. Moreover, 
as they are incapable of synthesising ribosomes8, they are incapable of reproducing 
themselves independently from the host cell. A virus never arises from a pre-existing virus. 
The components of a virus are synthesised independently before being assembled, whereas 
with cell-reproduction, the individuality of the cell is always maintained (Dimmock & 
Primrose, 1994: 13). 
In other words, viruses are ‘made present’ through an activation of their reproduction in more 
or less controlled environments. It is their attachment to technologies of multiplication, 
serology and genetics that enables the virologist to produce a diagnosis and identification of 
viral ‘presence’, including an understanding of its reproductive specificity and its relationship 
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with the susceptible organism’s immunoresponse system. The first step in the formation of the 
virus as a virtual object is that it has to be visualized - either optically or indexically. Second, 
it has to be signified, that is endowed with specific meaning through which the objectification 
can be anchored into the symbolic order, and become a discursive object, engendering a 
discursive formation. Third, it has to be valorized; the virtual object must not only be 
endowed with meaning, this endowment must be attributed particular value in terms if its 
significance within the wider emergent discursive formation. Objectification, therefore, is 
nothing but the singular decoding and encoding of a territory, a re-organization of particles 
and forces, not simply in terms of ‘knowledge’, as for example in the Kuhnian notion of 
‘paradigm’, or as ‘discursive formation’ as in the Foucauldean notion of ‘episteme’, but first 
and foremost in practices and technologies of enpresenting.  
Moreover, it should also be noted that for each of these aforementioned technologies of 
visualization there is already an inherent differentiation of the virtual object, a virus, as it 
becomes a protein coating left behind after successful infection, a trace made visible by a 
residual antibody, and (dioxy) ribonucleic acid. The fact that many virologists already acted 
on the basis of an assumption that these three in fact enpresented the same ‘it’ comes not from 
the ‘itness’ of the virtual object, but from the formation of a singular assemblage, which was 
further strengthened by the incorporation of biophysics and electron microscopy, and the 
genetic revolution of molecular biology that came onto many of the life sciences like a thief in 
the night. 
However, whereas the singular assemblage of virology could be identified as a successful 
accomplishment, as far as other technosciences and in particular epidemiology and clinical 
medicine are concerned, the re-territorialization of the mileu of virulent pathogens has 
produced less stability in objectification. It has proven to be far more difficult to engender a 
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sustainable, transcoding of ‘itness’ of viruses outside laboratory conditions (see for example 
McCormick and Fisher-Hoch, 1996; Ryan, 1996). For example, although there are many 
stories of successful vaccines being developed, there are numerous indications that the rapid 
mutability of viruses (e.g. Influenza, HIV, Dengue, Hanta) and bacteria (e.g. Meningitis, 
Streptococcus, Staphylococcus) as well as the sheer quantity of emergent unknown pathogens 
will continue to inhibit both the effectivity of clinical medicine and the ability of developing 
rational strategies of epidemic risk management (Garret, 1994; Morse, 1993). The conditions 
under which epidemiologists have to work when faced with a potential epidemic outbreak do 
not favour the kinds of indexical stabilization upon which virology relies to ‘fix’ its virtual 
object and perhaps require a more open, contingent and ad-hoc approach.  
Hence, we would be foolish to suggest that viruses are ‘merely’ discursive constructions; 
nothing is ‘merely’ a discursive construction. Discursive constructions are hardly ever that 
innocent anyway. However, in the case of viruses, we can see that rather than a heroic 
persistence of virologists to stick with their virtual object, it was a re-territorialization of an 
existing field, that of microbiology, that enabled the emergent virology to organize a set of 
practices to ‘code’ a particular territory of knowledge by which – even if severely restricted – 
it was able to stabilize a particular ‘objectification’ (‘the virus’) and make it sustainable across 
a wide range of visualizations, significations and valorizations. Although at this stage I can 
merely speculate about the extend of the actor network, the nature of the alliances formed not 
only with other clinical and laboratory sciences, but above all with those involved in ‘public 
health management’, including pharmaceutical industries and military organizations, are 
likely to have been instrumental in ‘fixing’ the objectification of the virus in such a way that it 
became  a ‘property’ of this emergent assemblage of ‘virology’. At this stage, however, it 
suffices to point out that what is often referred to as ‘science’ or ‘technoscience’ is itself a 
myriad of alliances and lines of flight. Ambivalence and instability characterize the formation 
 17
Pr
e-P
rin
t
a contagious living fluid 
of objects and modes of enunciation of scientific discourse and virology is no exception.  
Conclusions 
In this article, three specific points have been made. First, the history of virology provides an 
account of how the objective status of ‘the virus’ has been an accomplishment, rather than a 
matter of fact. This is an obvious point and merely echoes two decades of work in science and 
technology studies on various techno-scientific objects. However, it may be necessary to 
stress that what is talked about in this paper is not the alleged ‘lack’ of objectivity of ‘the 
virus’, but the primary significance of its ‘objectification’, which must – out of necessity – 
always come before any claim or assertion about any ‘objectivity’. Moreover, although the 
analysis in this article was mainly focused on virology as a laboratory science, the fact that it 
already revealed the multiplicity of objectifications indicates that we should expect even more 
virulent ambivalence, volatility and uncertainty when other domains and actors, such as 
clinical medicine, epidemiology and public health, are brought into the picture. 
The second point is directly related to this, namely that the specific technoscientific 
objectification of ‘the virus’ took place through an inter-disciplinary de-differentiation of 
research questions, methodologies, techniques and technologies or what Thomas Kuhn 
referred to as 'revolutionary science'. The fact that there was for so long a suspended closure 
of the question of what ‘the virus’ actually is (that is. ‘a’ virus), is an illustration of Kuhn’s 
theory of a normal science that cannot deal with anomalies; it also shows quite effectively 
how Lakatos’ notion of a negative heuristic operates as a denial that is the key to happiness. 
Until the 1940s, there was indeed enormous disagreement, which primarily related to what 
was being revealed by the technologies of visualization - plaque assay method, serology and 
bio-chemistry. Peirce’s notion of indexicality helps us to understand how ‘the virus’ became a 
virtual object whose ontology depended on the specific technologies of visualization with 
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which it was being disclosed. Indeed, until the arrival of the electron microscope in 1939, 
which asserted the near monopoly of visual identification, it is safe to say that even in the 
field of (proto)virology, the virus was a multiple virtual object whose actualization was either 
as protein coating, antibody-response, or (dioxy-) ribonucleic acid.  
The electron microscope was the first optic technology of visualization. It hailed the start of 
phage group formed around a group of German exiles in USA (most notably Delbrück), 
which enabled the integration of biophysics, genetics, biochemstry and molecular biology and 
led to the now widely accepted theory of viral reproduction and to the start of virology as a 
‘discipline’. However, even after this disciplinary closure under the leadership of molecular 
biology, the virus remained predominantly a virtual object. Whereas the laboratory sciences 
may now be able to exert a monopoly of diagnostics, this is not particularly effective in 
medical technoscience, whose technologies of visualization are based on a more diffused 
enrolment of ‘objectifications’, including those of the bodies of their patients (see, for 
example, Berg and Mol, 1998). More importantly perhaps, viruses ‘exist’ as virtual objects far 
beyond the domains of laboratory and clinical technoscience, they are engendered by 
political, mass-mediated and popular cultural technologies of signification, and let us not 
forget those technologies of valorization, specifically those of governance and commerce, that 
equally endorse ‘the’ (which should now be ‘a’) virus as a multiple virtual object. This is in 
line with existing ethnographic work on ‘virtual objects’ (Law, 1995; Mol, 1998) which 
suggests that virtual objects multiply when being disclosed by different technologies and 
discourses that add to but do not often add up. 
However, despite this obvious multiplicity, virology has been able to exercise some form of 
closure onto processes of identification which, not surprisingly, is the most stable aspect of 
our understanding of viruses. This relates to the third conclusion, namely that  viruses only 
 19
Pr
e-P
rin
t
a contagious living fluid 
became intelligible after the establishment of a virology-assemblage. Although the built up to 
this has been a gradual process, its inauguration in the early 1950s was radical and sudden 
because only then could the various substrands of virological technoscience affect each other 
through deliberate enrolment and engender a universal intelligibility (often mistaken as 
'facts'). This is not to suggest that viruses are totally intelligible, but before their inauguration 
in virology, that is before any settlement of a plausible answer to the question of what enables 
us to unify a particular group of pathogens under the heading of ‘viruses’, the objectification 
of a virus as virus had no intelligibility as such. 
These specific points can be linked further, to three more general points. The first is that 
objectification (not objectivity) is necessarily the accomplishment of a singular assemblage. 
That is to say, only when a gathering of technologies of visualization, signification and 
valorization can be mobilized to trace a virtual object whose identification has been stabilized 
(even if in multiple forms), can it become ‘objectified’ as a ‘matter of fact’. Despite the fact 
that, for example, clinical and laboratory technoscientific work with viruses engenders two 
different kinds of virtual object, there remains a fundamental (even if only imagined) 
singularity of the ‘itness’ (a virus) of what remains undisclosed from full presence, yet 
‘inherent’ in the very concerted effort of visualization, signification and valorization.  
The second general point is that unintelligibility is not a quality of the (virtual) object (or lack 
thereof), but of the absence of a singular assemblage. That is to say, viruses are no longer entirely 
unintelligible because they can de ‘identified’ and ‘enpresented’, even ‘ordered’ to perform 
particular effects in more or less predictable ways. This is not to say that there is not a residue of 
unintelligibility. As the case of germ theory in the last century has shown, there always is. The 
very multiplicity of the virtual object itself reveals that the engendered singularity of ‘itness’  is 
an imagined origin of the revealed truth of viruses. The effective singularity of the virus, which is 
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being disclosed by virology, is a performative closure of multiplicities by an ensemble of 
technologies. The lack of an effective juxtapositioning of these multiplicities of ‘itness’ before 
the shift to biophysics and molecular biology virology assemblage was thus responsible for the 
ongoing confusion about the nature of ‘viroid life’.  
This immediately sets up the third and final point. Objectification is the conquest of 
unintelligibility: enpresenting and challenging-forth hitherto 'unknown' existents. The case of 
19th century germ theory, which depended so heavily on the cell theory of life, already shows 
that under this paradigm a molecular concept of life (such as that of the contagium vivo 
fluidum) was completely unintelligible. The experiments by Iwanowski and Beyerinck, 
however sparked off a new line of flight of objectification which eventually resulted in a 
partial overturning of microbiology. The tragedy of modern science, however, is that it can 
only be driven by such a desire to conquer the unintelligible if it immediately forgets it at the 
same time. This results in a series of ‘false promises’ of final pieces of the puzzle having been 
found that would complete the picture. Looking back at the history of virology, it becomes 
almost self-evident to claim that it will have engendered new unintelligibilities, such as, for 
example, those surrounding the relationship between HIV and AIDS, as well as the nature of 
other ‘viroids’ such as prions. Rather than a victorious narrative of conquest and colonization 
of the unknown, it suggest that modern science is more like poetry which is described in the 
Qor’aan as ‘being followed by the wandering and lost’. 
Endnotes 
 
1. Ivanovski himself believed that what passed through the filter was not an organism but a 
bacterial toxin. Beyerinck’s studies between 1897 and 1899, however, did not reveal any 
traces of bacterial residue in the filtrates that would explain the production of such toxin. 
Moreover, unlimited amounts of previously healthy tobacco plants could be re-infected 
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with the filtrate of sap of infected plants and subsequently infect each other without 
further administration of this sap (Smith-Hughes, 1977: 44-48). In 1898, Loeffler and 
Frosch came to similar conclusions regarding food and mouth disease. 
2. This etymology of the word virus shows a remarkable consistency in the confusion 
between infection and conception. Both terms refer to a transgression of limits, but 
whereas the first merely indicates the introduction of ‘foreign’ (bacterial or viral) DNA, 
the second points towards the more radical accomplishment of the inauguration of new 
life. 
3. When using words such as ‘discovery’ in relation to a narrative of a history of a science, 
one always runs the risk of re-inventing an unfolding of event through actions of heroes 
who – against all odds – provided new ‘truths’ despite the obstacles of ‘tradition’ and 
‘ignorance’, often associated with vested interests. Latour’s epic account of the work of 
‘Pasteur’ (not the man, but the assemblage), however, shows that neither narrative nor plot 
nor hero should be confused with the particular science in action. Although one may 
object to the latent historicism that underscores much of his analysis, in particular when 
reflecting on ‘motivations’ and ‘reasons’ behind certain actions, the idea that a history of a 
science is itself part of the assemblage that produces its objectification (see, for example, 
Foucault, 1970) necessarily stresses the persistence of struggle, contradiction and 
ambivalence, rather than the modernist ideal of ‘Aufhebung’. 
4. ‘In 1948 only twenty specifically human viruses were known; by 1959 the number had 
risen to seventy’ (Smith-Hughes, 1977: 98). 
5. It is worth pointing out in this context the excellent critical work done in this context by 
the late Jonathan Mann and his associates on AIDS and health-related human rights issues 
(Mann et al, 1992; Mann et al, 1999). 
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6. Another example of this would be the work of Pasteur and ‘his’ associates (actor 
network), who – together with other social movements -  were highly effective in 
articulating the manifold manifestations of a range of infectious diseases in a singular 
language evolving around the virtual object of ‘the microbe’. 
7. In clinical medicine which deals with a different kind of virtual object – namely a virulent 
pathogen causing a disease – the essential visualization comes in totally different forms: a 
rash, a fever, coughing etc. 
8. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Biology (1996 edition), ribosomes are a small 
spherical bodies within a living cell consisting of RNA and protein. They are sites of 
protein synthesis. 
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